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INTRODUCTION

After thirty-eight years, Miranda v. Arizona' remains a case in search of
a constitutional basis.
Miranda's constitutional problems began with the Miranda opinion
itself. Based on the Warren Court's then recent decisions in Gideon v.
Wainwright,2 Massiah v. United States,3 and Escobedo v. Illinois,4 Ernesto
Miranda's defense counsel argued that suspects facing custodial
interrogation had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Chief Justice
Warren, however, began his majority opinion in Miranda by announcing
that the decision would instead be predicated on the Fifth Amendment's
6
Self-Incrimination Clause. Courts and commentators immediately tried
to explain the exact nature of the relationship between the new Miranda
The search for the
warnings and the Self-Incrimination Clause.7
definitive account of Miranda's constitutional foundation has been

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963) (holding that Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel is fundamental right; thus Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees assistance of counsel to any state defendant charged
with felony).
I See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964) (stating that Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel forbids government from using secret agent to
deliberately elicit incriminating statements about crime for which defendant has already
been charged).
' See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (holding that when suspect is
focus of police investigation and police wish to engage him in custodial interrogation,
police deny him his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel if they refuse his
request to consult with counsel and fail to warn him of his absolute right to remain silent).
' See John J. Flynn, Panel Discussion on the Exclusionary Rule, 61 F.R.D. 259, 278 (1972),
quoted in YALE KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 462 (10th ed.) (2000) ("When
certiorari was granted ... we agreed that the briefs should be written with the entire focus
on the Sixth Amendment [right to counsel] because that is where the Court was headed
after Escobedo, and, as you are all aware, in the very first paragraph [of the Mirandaopinion]
Chief Justice Warren said, 'It is the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution that is at issue
today.' That was Miranda'seffective use of counsel.").
6 Miranda,384 U.S. at 439.
' See generally Symposium: Miranda After Dickerson: The Future of Confession Law, 99
MICH. L. REV. 879 (2001) (containing comprehensive review of both cases and literature
dealing with constitutional issues surrounding Miranda).
2
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rivaled only by attempts to prove Fermat's Last Theorem.'
The Supreme Court itself first muddied the waters in 1971 when it
held that statements obtained in violation of Miranda, which could not be
used in the prosecution's case-in-chief, could nevertheless be used for
impeachment. 9 Then, beginning in 1974, the Burger Court repeatedly
held that Miranda warnings themselves were not actually required by the
Fifth Amendment, but functioned rather as a "prophylactic" that overprotected the right against self-incrimination; in other words, sometimes
a statement obtained in violation of Miranda actually violated the Fifth
Amendment and sometimes it did not. 10
Regardless, the Supreme Court continued to maintain that any
statement obtained in violation of Miranda could not be used in the
prosecution's case-in-chief. This led the late Professor Joseph Grano to
contend that if indeed the prophylactic quality of Miranda sometimes
resulted in state courts being forced to suppress perfectly constitutional
confessions, then Miranda was a constitutionally illegitimate decision."
In response, commentators such as David Strauss argued that
prophylactic rules were constitutionally legitimate, 12 while Stephen J.
Schulhofer maintained that all statements produced in violation of
Miranda actually did run afoul
of the Fifth Amendment because they had
13
been, afortiori,compelled.

' Fermat's Last Theorem - which states that the equation x" + y" = z' has no solution
for non-zero integers x, y, and z, if n is an integer greater than two - remained unproven
for over 350 years. See, e.g., http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/proof.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,225-26 (1971).
1o See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (stating that Miranda warnings are
not rights themselves under Fifth Amendment, but rather "procedural safeguards" to
protect that right). Tucker held that the police conduct had not violated respondent's right
against self-incrimination, even though the conduct had violated the protections
established by Miranda. Id. at 445. See also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)
(explaining that Miranda warnings are intended to act merely as "practical reinforcement"
of one's Fifth Amendment rights). Quarles found that the police officers had failed to give
the proper warnings before interrogation, but nevertheless held that this conduct did not
amount to coercion in direct violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 654-55. See also
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985) (reinforcing notion that Miranda warning is
"prophylactic rule" but is not constitutional right per se). Elstad held that where police
officers have merely failed to give proper Miranda warnings, the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine does not apply because it requires a constitutional violation as a prerequisite
for its application. Id. at 305-07.
" Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III
Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100, 123-56 (1985).
12 David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 209 (1988).
" Stephen J. Schulhofer, ReconsideringMiranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 453 (1987).
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Courts and commentators have not been able to agree on just how to
describe a statement produced in violation of Miranda.
Is it
"compelled"? 14 Is it "presumed compelled"?" Is it "coerced"? 16 Is there
a difference between coercion and compulsion?17 If not, should there be?
All this, of course, was supposed to have been settled four years ago
by Dickerson v. United States.'8 Dickerson re-affirmed Miranda, but shed

Id. at 442.
See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("When police ask custodial questions without administering the
required warnings, Miranda quite clearly requires that the answers received be presumed
compelled and that they be excluded from evidence at trial.").
1" See id. at 684 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Miranda] was a decision about coerced
confessions.").
" Traditionally, the Supreme Court has used "coercion" to describe the kind of
government malfeasance that led to a confession being found to be "involuntary" and thus
inadmissible for any purpose under the Due Process Clause. See Haynes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) (finding confession "involuntary" under Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause, noting that "confession was obtained in an atmosphere of substantial
coercion"); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954) ("The use in a state criminal trial of a
defendant's confession obtained by coercion - whether physical or mental - is forbidden
by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 280 (1936) (finding
confessions procured by police violence against defendant to be "involuntary" under
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and noting "that [the confessions] were
procured by coercion was not questioned"). The Miranda Court took great pains to note
that statements that would have to be suppressed for Miranda warning violations - and
thus found improperly "compelled" under the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause
- may not necessarily have been "coerced" under the Due Process Clause. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-49 (1966). As the Miranda Court explicitly held in considering
the various confessions involved in the case, "[W]e might not find the defendants'
statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms." Id. at 457. The Court then went
on to describe the Miranda warnings as a device necessary to "dispel the compulsion
inherent in custodial surroundings." Id. at 458 (emphasis added). Moreover, Stephen J.
Schulhofer has convincingly argued that "coercion" under the "involuntariness" test of the
Due Process Clause and "compulsion" under the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause are indeed separate and distinct concepts. Schulhofer, supra note 13 at 441-44.
Yet Supreme Court opinions after Miranda have never recognized this distinction.
See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, Separated At Birth But Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the
Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1086-87 (2001) (discussing how Supreme
Court's subsequent refusal to recognize Miranda's distinction between "coerced" and
"compelled" statements has essentially transformed Miranda into Due Process Clause,
rather than Self-Incrimination Clause, case). As previously noted, Justice Marshall in his
dissent in Quarles - joined by both Justices Brennan and Stevens - inaccurately referred
to Miranda as a case about "coerced" confessions. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 684 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). And most recently the Court pointedly referred to the "coercion inherent" in
custodial interrogation (Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000)), while blithely
ignoring that Miranda itself, relying on the Self-Incrimination Clause, specifically referred
to the "compulsion inherent" in custodial interrogation. Miranda,384 U.S. at 458 (emphasis
added).
18 Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).

HeinOnline -- 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1112 2003-2004

Rethinking Miranda

20041

1113

absolutely no light on just why the Self-Incrimination Clause requires
Miranda warnings. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for seven members
of the Court unhelpfully tells us that "Miranda is a constitutional
decision," 9 "Miranda is constitutionally based," 20 and that Miranda has
"constitutional underpinnings.'" 21 But nowhere does it explain why.
Justice Scalia in dissent may not have been far off the mark when he
wrote that it would have been impossible for the Court's opinion to have
simply said that custodial interrogation not preceded by Miranda
warnings violated the Constitution; Scalia acerbically suggested that the
opinion could not have said this because "a majority of the Court does
not believe it."2
Dickerson appears to have settled very little.23 This was borne out last
May by the Court's most recent opinion dealing with a Miranda issue,
24
Chavez v. Martinez. Chavez held that there is no Fifth Amendment
violation when the police merely obtain statements through custodial
interrogation without providing Miranda warnings; the Fifth
Amendment is only implicated if the statements are actually used in a
criminal case against the suspect.2- How many times did the two26
Dickerson?
primary opinions constituting the majority's holding cite
Zero. The situation promises to become even more confusing during the
2003 Term in which the Court has already heard two more major cases
involving Miranda issues. 27

'9

Id. at 432-38.

22 Id.at 440.

Id.at 440 n.5.
dissenting).
Id. at 446 (Scalia, J.,
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth
Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV. 941, 941 (2001) (writing that Dickerson
"perpetuated an extraordinarily confusing and illogical notion of what the Fifth
Amendment means").
"3 Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003).
' Id. at 1999-2004 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J.,
and Scalia, J.); id. at 2013 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Stevens, J.).
26 The decision was cobbled together from parts of Justice Thomas's opinion that
announced the judgment of the Court and parts of Justice Souter's separate opinion. Id. at
1999-2004 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion); id. at 2008 (Souter, J., writing for majority on
scope of remand).
" See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct.
1788 (2003) (determining whether Miranda violation requires suppression of physical
evidence); Missouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S.Ct. 2091 (2003)
(deciding whether Oregon v. Elstad is limited only to situations in which initial failure to
provide Miranda warnings was unintentional).
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Faced with the Gordian knot of Miranda'srelationship with the SelfIncrimination Clause, this Essay will eschew the path of Alexander the
Great. That is, it will neither critique nor attempt to undo any of the last
thirty-eight years of cases and commentary on Miranda and the Fifth
28
Amendment. All of this is beyond the scope of this Essay.
Instead, this Essay will suggest that there is a reason why courts and
commentators have had so much trouble reconciling Miranda with the
Fifth Amendment. Quite simply, the real values of Miranda are Fourth
Amendment values. Miranda is a Fourth Amendment case dressed up in
Fifth Amendment clothes. And there is a reason the Court had to choose
an ill-fitting Fifth Amendment wardrobe: the Court decided Miranda in
1966, two years before it would decide three very significant search and
seizure cases that would clarify the relationship between custodial
interrogation and the Fourth Amendment.2
Why the Fourth Amendment? Because - although this was not clear
in 1966 - interrogation is nothing less than an attempt to "search" a
person's mind. And when the police obtain answers to their questions,
they are "seizing" the person's words.
Although government interrogations always involve Fourth
Amendment issues, there is normally no need to consider these issues.
On the one hand, a person not in custody has no legal obligation to
answer any question. If he refuses to answer, fine. If he responds,
however, he is giving his implicit "consent" to the "search" and there is
no Fourth Amendment problem.
On the other hand, if the government presents a person with a
subpoena or an immunity order, the person has a legal duty to answer.
The subpoena or immunity order functions as the equivalent of a
warrant; the interrogation is then a legal search; and the answers can be
legally seized.
There is, however, one kind of interrogation that implicates the Fourth
Amendment in a unique way: interrogation of a suspect in police
custody. Although a suspect in custody has the legal right to refuse to
answer, the aura surrounding a custodial interrogation might make the
suspect believe that the police have the authority to force him to answer

That is, this Essay accepts as settled law the Supreme Court's repeated assertions
over the last third of a century that Miranda is a Fifth Amendment case. The analysis
offered in this Essay is intended to supplement, but not supersede, the Court's extensive
body of Mirandaholdings based on the Fifth Amendment.
' See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); infra notes 30, 39, 41 and accompanying
text.
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their questions. This "false authority" is similar to the non-existent
warrant the police used to get the grandmother to consent to the search
in Bumper v. North Carolina. Bumper found that the police officer's lying
about the existence of the warrant constituted coercion serious enough to
make the grandmother's consent invalid and the resulting search
unconstitutional. Similarly, the false authority the police appear to
possess from the atmosphere surrounding a custodial interrogation
means that the consent an unwarned suspect gives by merely answering
the questions is equally invalid, and all answers must be suppressed.
May the police ever conduct a custodial interrogation? Certainly.
They merely need to obtain the suspect's consent before they begin their
search, i.e., the interrogation. The suspect must be warned that he has
the legal right not to answer questions. He should be told something
along the line of - well, something like, "You have the right to remain
silent." (Ironically, as we shall see, the current Miranda warnings more
accurately express rights under the Fourth Amendment than they do the
Fifth Amendment.31)
As this Essay will demonstrate, there are numerous benefits to seeing
custodial interrogation in a Fourth Amendment light. First, it eliminates
the tiresome Fifth Amendment debates about compulsion, presumed
compulsion, and prophylactic rules; quite simply, a custodial
interrogation conducted without proper consent is an unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Second, contrary to
Chavez's view of the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment would
find that a constitutional violation occurs at the moment thefirst answer
is obtained as a result of a Miranda violation. This means that, under the
Fourth Amendment, police departments can be civilly sanctioned for
flouting Miranda even if the statements are never used at a criminal trial
- something that cannot be done under Chavez's interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment.3 ' Third, the Fourth Amendment forbids use of "fruit
of the poisonous tree," thus eliminating the Fifth Amendment loophole
from Oregon v. Elstad that allows police to obtain inadmissible statements
through Miranda violations and then, merely by having the suspect
repeat the statements after proper Miranda warnings and waiver, to
magically transform them into admissible statements.3 3 Finally, the
Fourth Amendment approach provides a much more principled

Bumper, 391 U.S. at 546. Note that Bumper was decided two years after Miranda.
n See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
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rationale for recognizing the current "public safety" and "routine
booking question" exceptions to Miranda.34
So if the Fourth Amendment approach is superior, why did the Court
not use it in Miranda? This Essay suggests that the real reason may have
been one of timing. If Miranda had been decided just two years later in 1968, rather than 1966 - attorneys and judges may very well have
utilized a Fourth Amendment approach based on the three important
Fourth Amendment decisions the Court had recently issued. But once
Miranda decided that custodial interrogation was a Fifth Amendment
issue, it permanently set the constitutional contours for the next thirtyeight years.
This Essay is an attempt to think outside the Fifth Amendment box.
I.

ARE SPOKEN WORDS CAPABLE OF BEING "SEARCHED AND SEIZED"
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?

The Fourth Amendment applies only to searches and seizures. Seizure
has been defined as "the act of physically taking and removing tangible
personal property." 36 The Supreme Court has said that a seizure of
property occurs when "there is some meaningful37 interference with an
individual's possessory interests in that property."
Can intangibles such as words be seized merely by listening to a person
speak? In the past, some have argued that this was not possible. In
Olmstead v. United States, the famous wiretap case decided in 1928, the
Court held that "[tihere was no seizure" because the "evidence was
secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only."5 Years later
Justice Black wrote, "It simply requires an imaginative transformation of
the English language to say that conversations can be searched and
words seized. 3 9 Similarly, Justice Harlan stated, "Just as some exercise
of dominion, beyond mere perception, is necessary for the seizure of
tangibles, so some use of the conversation beyond that
initial listening
4
process is required for the seizure of the spoken word." 0

See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
See Bumper, 391 U.S. 543; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3 1 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(a), at 375-76 (3d ed. 1996).
31 Id. (citing United States v. Jacobsen,466 U.S. 109 (1984)).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
9 Berger, 388 U.S. at 78 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 98 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Yet it is now clear that the spoken word can be seized under the Fourth
Amendment. In 1967 - only one year after Miranda - the Court
decided the watershed case of Katz v. United States4' and rejected the
rationale of Olmstead. In considering the government's warrantless
wiretapping of a telephone conversation made in a public phone booth,
the Court held that "[tihe Government's activities in electronically
listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and
thus constitutes a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment., 42 That same year in Berger v. New York, another wiretap
case, the Court stated that "authorization of eavesdropping for a two
month period is the equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and
seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause."43
Katz and Berger also show why listening to another's words can
constitute a search as well as a seizure. Although Professor LaFave notes
that the U.S. Supreme Court "has never managed to set out a
comprehensive definition of the word 'searches' as it is used in the
Fourth Amendment,""4 it has at times defined what a search is not. In
Olmstead in 1928, the Court held that placing a tap on telephone wires
outside a house in order to hear Olmstead's telephone conversations
inside the house "did not amount to a search ... within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment" because the "wires are not part of his house or
45
office, any more than are the highways along which they are stretched."
Olmstead was the source of the doctrine that there could be no search
under the Fourth Amendment without a trespass into a "constitutionally
protected area. "46
All this changed during the Warren Court era. In 1961 the Court held
that the secret recording of oral statements constituted a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment even without any technical
trespass under local property law.47 And, as discussed above, in 1967 the
Court in both Katz and Berger formally rejected Olmstead by holding that

" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
' Id. at 353; see also Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 343 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2003)
(holding that police videotaping of arrestee's "perp walk" was seizure of arrestee's image
and noting, "The Fourth Amendment seizure has long encompassed the seizure of
intangibles as well as tangibles.").
" Berger, 388 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added).
" LAFAVE, supra note 36 at 380.
" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
' Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
47 Id.
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a warrantless wiretap constituted both an unconstitutional search and an
unconstitutional seizure.4
The underlying rationale supporting the idea that spoken words can
be the object of both a search and a seizure was strengthened by the
Court's decision three years ago in Kyllo v. United States.49 There the
Court held that the use of a "thermal imager" that could measure the
amount of heat emanating from a house constituted a search under the
Fourth Amendment. The dissenters argued that no search occurred
because the thermal imaging device could not penetrate the walls of the
house, but could merely "passivey measure heat emitted from the
exterior surfaces of [the] home."
Yet the majority rejected this
purported distinction between "through-the-wall" and "off-the-wall"
surveillance as being inconsistent with the reasoning of Katz. As the
Kyllo majority noted:
Ujust as a thermal imager captures only heat emanating from a
house, so also a powerful directional microphone picks up only
sound emanating from a house.... We rejected such a mechanical
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz, where the
eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that reached the
exterior of the phone booth."s
In terms of seizing the spoken word, how far can this rationale be
extended? The spoken word is the palpable manifestation of a person's
innermost thoughts. Should not a person also be protected from the
government "getting inside his head" to discover his thoughts?
In the film What Women Want,5 2 the character played by Mel Gibson
developed the ability to know what women were thinking. What if this
ability could be turned into a mechanical device?
Assume the
government created a mechanism - let's call it a "thought imager" that could read a person's mind. All the government agent would have
to do is point it at a person from up to fifty yards away and the screen
would produce a read-out of that person's thoughts. The person would
never know that the thought imager was being used on him. Would this
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment?
Before answering, recall what Kyllo said about the sanctity of a
person's house: "[T]he Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at the
See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
s' Id. at 35.
52 WHAT WOMEN WANT (Paramount Pictures 2000).
"
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entrance to the house."'5 3 The Court rejected the argument that the
amount of heat emanating from the house was trivial information,
stating, "In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details,
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes. " 54
Why does the home get this favored protection under the Fourth
Amendment? The answer is obvious: "houses" is one of the four
categories the Fourth Amendment explicitly protects from unreasonable
searches and seizures.
But recall another of the four favored categories: "persons." We
normally think of Fourth Amendment protection of persons in terms of
seizures (i.e., arrests and Terry stops) and searches of a person's body
and clothing. But after Kyllo, it seems clear that the Fourth Amendment
would protect a person from the warrantless use of our hypothetical
thought imager. If, when we consider that inside a house "all details are
intimate details," how much more intimate are the very thoughts inside
a person's head?
II.

IF BOTH THOUGHTS AND SPOKEN WORDS MERIT PROTECTION UNDER

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, WHY AREN'T MORE SUPPRESSION MOTIONS
PREDICATED ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?

There are at least three reasons why more motions to suppress
defendants' statements are not predicated on the Fourth Amendment.
First, wiretaps have only a limited, albeit important, impact on criminal
law. Second, of course, there is no thought imager. But third, and
perhaps most importantly, the Fourth Amendment has little actual effect
on the admissibility of most words spoken by a person to a government
official. This is true for several reasons.
First, consider a situation similar to that in Colorado v. Connelly, in
which a Rerson walks up to a police officer on the street and confesses to
a crime.
Obviously the Fourth Amendment would not prevent the
prosecution from using this confession against the defendant at trial. As
the Supreme Court made clear in Katz, "What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not subject to

" Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,590 (1980)).
Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
55 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 160, 165 (1986) (stating that confession made
by person whose psychosis arguably interfered with his ability to make free and rational
choices was nonetheless "voluntary" because improper state action was sine qua non for
finding of "involuntariness").
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Fourth Amendment protection. " 56 No Fourth Amendment interest is
implicated.
Second, consider a situation where a person confesses to a "false
friend" who is actually a secret government agent. The Court again has
come to the same conclusion: no Fourth Amendment implications.
When a person willingly speaks to someone who appears to be a nongovernmental official, he runs the risk that that person may actually be a
false friend.5 7 The Supreme Court affirmed this in a post-Katz decision in
which the government agent/false friend was also armed with a radio
transmitter.5 8
But these cases deal with a person telling someone "what's on his
mind" with little or no prompting. What about cases involving police
interrogation? Interrogation, after all, is merely a method for finding out
what is going on in a person's mind, i.e., searching inside a person's
head. And taking information is as much of a seizure as taking things. 9
Is interrogation different from an ordinary police search? Should an
officer be forbidden from posing questions to a person on the street
without first obtaining a warrant?
Think about a police officer's questioning of a person in a non-custodial
environment. Assume arguendo that asking a question is indeed an
attempt to search a person's mind and to seize the words he uses for an
answer. The officer's attempt to question without a warrant is perfectly
proper under the Fourth Amendment for one very important reason: the
person is free to refuse to answer. Obviously, the officer has no legal
right to obtain an answer. Therefore, a question by an officer in a noncustodial setting is also a per se request for Fourth Amendment consent.
If the person answers the question, he is agreeing to share the workings
of his mind and the information he possesses with the officer; in Fourth
Amendment terms, he is consenting to a search of his mind. In other
words, the person's answer implicitly includes consent to the search and
seizure.

s' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967).
17
See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966) (holding that conversations
relayed by paid government informant are not protected by Fourth Amendment as speaker
is not protected when he voluntarily confides information to listener who later betrays his
confidence and reports conversation).
' See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 754 (1971) (holding that Fourth Amendment
rights are not implicated when paid informant carries electronic recording device that
relays conversation to police).
' See supranotes 38-45 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, a person is always free to refuse the request for
Fourth Amendment consent by simply not answering the question.
Recall that the Fourth Amendment does not require an officer to
explicitly tell a suspect in a non-custodial setting that he has a right to
refuse. 6° Thus, a non-custodial person's voluntarily choosing to answer
the question can be construed as giving consent under the Fourth
Amendment. And under the Fourth Amendment, consent obviates the
need for a warrant. 6' This is why police are allowed to conduct noncustodial questioning without a warrant.
Conversely, the government has the power in certain cases to force a
person to allow the government to search his mind and seize his
answers. As Stephen J. Schulhofer has noted, "[Tihe general rule is that
the government can legitimately compel witnesses to say what they
know.... ,,62 The government can do this through subpoenas to testify
not only at trial, but also before a grand jury or government agencies.
Where the person has interposed a valid assertion of his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, the government can trump
this with a court order granting immunity and forcing the person to
testify.63 Subpoenas and immunity orders function as equivalents to the
Fourth Amendment "warrant requirement."
Thus, in most government interrogation situations there is no
conscious need to consider the Fourth Amendment implications - even
' See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (holding that express
knowledge of right to refuse consent is not dispositive but only one factor in determining
whether consent was voluntarily given in non-custodial setting).
61 See Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that consent is
exception to warrant requirement, and that even when consent is retracted, officer with
probable cause may retain goods she received while consent was operative); Fox v. Van
Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 357 n.4 (6th Cir. 1999) (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (stating that because consent is exception to the warrant requirement seizure
should consequently be limited to what was actually permitted by owner).
The U.S. Supreme Court has said, "[W]e have held repeatedly that mere police
questioning does not constitute a seizure." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). But,
as Bostick itself illustrates, this has always assumed a non-custodial setting; indeed, Bostick
goes on to say that police may ask questions of any individual "as long as the police do not
convey a message that compliance with their requests is required." Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
And, of course, that is precisely the message that is conveyed during custodial
interrogation: that the suspect must answer the police questions. This is why custodial
interrogation implicates Fourth Amendment interests.
See infra notes 68-72 and
accompanying text.
62 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
26
VAL. U. L. REV. 311,313 (1991).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2002) (stating that court may order person to testify and
person must comply, but no testimony received under that order may be used against that
person in his or her own criminal case).
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though there are very real Fourth Amendment interests at stake.
Subpoenas, immunity orders, consent, refusal to answer in a noncustodial setting - in most situations one of these options will
sufficiently satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
Yet this has blinded us to the one government interrogation situation
that does have serious Fourth Amendment implications: custodial
interrogation by the police.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION: WHY HAVE THEY BEEN IGNORED?
When the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Miranda v. Arizona that
custodial interrogation was governed by the Fifth Amendment's SelfIncrimination Clause rather than the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel, it established the Self-Incrimination Clause as the sole
constitutional predicate for determining whether custodial interrogation
could occur. True, the Due Process Clause's "voluntariness" test could
still be used to define the parameters of how a custodial interrogation
could be conducted." But the issue of whether a custodial interrogation
can occur has been discussed for the last third of a century solely in SelfIncrimination Clause terms.
Why have the Fourth Amendment implications of custodial
interrogation been ignored?
One reason may be the Rehnquist Court's insistence that, whenever
possible, criminal procedure should not be governed by amorphous
"substantive due process" standards. As the Court has noted, "Beyond
the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process
Clause has limited operation."6 Related to this quest is the Court's
interest in finding the one, most explicit, constitutional guarantee
germane to any single issue.6
As previously noted, if Miranda had been decided in 1968 following
the Court's decisions in Katz, Berger, and Bumper, the Court may very
well have used a Fourth Amendment, rather than a Fifth Amendment,
approach to custodial interrogation. 67 But once the Supreme Court

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990).
See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989) (rejecting use of "substantive
due process" for claims of excessive force in effecting an arrest and insisting that Fourth
Amendment alone should govern such issues).
67 See supra notes 29, 41-43 and accompanying text; infra note 68 and accompanying
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decided to use a Fifth Amendment approach, the playing field was
defined for the next thirty-eight years.
The allure of Miranda has meant that the legal community has refused
to view custodial interrogation warnings through anything but the SelfIncrimination Clause. Yet, unquestionably, custodial interrogation is an
area that also needs to be viewed through a Fourth Amendment lens.
IV.

WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?

As previously discussed, although Fourth Amendment issues are
involved in all government interrogation situations, we rarely have
reason to consider them. Subpoenas, immunity orders, consent, refusals
to answer when the person has the right to refuse - all these eliminate
the need to consider the relation between the Fourth Amendment and
government interrogations.
There is, however, one exception. Custodial interrogation implicates
Fourth Amendment values in a unique way that has been too long
ignored.
Think of a police officer attempting to question a suspect in custody.
Miranda, based on a Self-Incrimination Clause rationale, characterizes
custodial interrogation as presenting an atmosphere of compulsion that
tends to force the suspect to answer questions. 6'
Yet, for Fourth Amendment purposes, this atmosphere can be
characterized in a different way. Under the Fourth Amendment, custody
lends a kind of false authority to the officer's attempt to interrogate.
Although the officer has no real authority to make the suspect answer
questions, the custodial atmosphere may make the suspect believe that
the officer actually possesses this power.
Note how unique this situation is in terms of government
interrogation and the Fourth Amendment. In interrogation situations
where the government has obtained either a subpoena or an immunity
order, the person does have a legal duty to answer. On the other hand, in
non-custodial situations, the person is free to answer or to refuse to
answer. In all these situations, there is no need to give extensive thought
to the Fourth Amendment.
However, in terms of government interrogation and the Fourth
Amendment, custodial interrogation is unique, perhaps sui generis. In
Fourth Amendment terms, the suspect may very well believe-

' Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).
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erroneously - that the police have the legal power to search his mind
and seize his words.
For Fourth Amendment purposes, custodial interrogation can be
analogized to the fact situation in Bumper v. North Carolina.9 Bumper's
grandmother allowed the police to search her home after one of the
officers said, "I have a search warrant to search your house." At the
hearing to suppress the rifle found during the search, the government
was unable to produce any search warrant. The Supreme Court held
that "[w]hen a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home
under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to
resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion - albeit
colorably lawful coercion. When there is coercion there cannot be consent." 7°
To put it bluntly, an atmosphere of custodial interrogation is the
equivalent of the police officer's lying about the existence of the warrant
in Bumper. In both cases, the police have no legal authority to do what
they wish to do, but this is not clear either to Ms. Bumper or to the
suspect in custody.
These concerns explain why, under a Fourth Amendment analysis, the
police must obtain consent before they can interrogate a suspect in
custody. 71 Since they lack legal authority, the police need voluntary
Fourth Amendment consent before they can use questions to search a
suspect's mind and seize his answers. Miranda-like warnings are
necessary to assure the suspect that, contrary to appearances, the police
have no legal authority to force him to "open his mind" to allow a search
and seizure of anything he knows.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that a suspect cannot be compelled
to be a witness against himself at a criminal trial. But the Fourth
Amendment goes further. The Fourth Amendment protects him from
the government's obtaining any information of any naturewhatsoever. That
is because the suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy over
everything in his head - not just information that may incriminate him.
To paraphrase Kyllo, the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the
entrance to a person's mind. Unlike the Fifth Amendment's interest only
69

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).

Id. at 550 (emphasis added); see also Kaupp v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 1843, 1847 (2003) (per
curiam) (holding that teenager's response of "OK" to police demands that he get out of bed
at 3 a.m. and immediately accompany them to station for questioning was not real
"consent" since it was "a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority" (quoting Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion))).
71 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991) (stating that Fourth
Amendment is implicated only when, viewed from totality of circumstances, reasonable
person would believe he is not free not to respond to the officer's questions).
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in self-incriminating statements that can be used at a criminal trial, the
Fourth Amendment's interest in autonomy protects the person from
revealing anything to the government, unless the government either
possesses proper authority or the person chooses to consent. To again
paraphrase Kyllo, a person's head, no less than his home, is an area that is
held safe from prying government eyes - and ears.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte held that police ordinarily have no duty to
tell a person that he has the right to refuse consent to a search. 72 But
Schneckloth specifically held that it had no application whatsoever to a
situation involving a person in custody. 73 Much like the illusory warrant
in Bumper, custodial interrogation surrounds the police with a false aura
of authority that must be neutralized by Miranda-likewarnings.
V.

WHICH FoURTH AMENDMENT VALUES ARE IMPLICIT IN THE CURRENT
MIRANDA WARNINGS?

It is odd that courts have ignored the Fourth Amendment values
involved in a custodial interrogation situation. It is particularly odd
because the Miranda warnings themselves reflect Fourth Amendment
values at least as accurately as they reflect Fifth Amendment values.
The first Mirandawarning states, "You have the right to remain silent."
The Fifth Amendment protects a person from being compelled to make
incriminating statements against his interest that will later be used at a
criminal trial. Yet the promise of "You have the right to remain silent"
goes beyond this. Indeed, the right to remain silent is a perfect way to
describe the Fourth Amendment values at stake.
The Fourth
Amendment prevents the government from looking into the mind of the
suspect for information of any kind. In the words of Kyllo, all "intimate
details" are protected from "prying government eyes." 74 The right to
silence has more to do with the autonomy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment than it does, strictly speaking, with the values of the Self-

72 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).

73 Id. at 240 n.29 ("[T]he present case does not require a determination of the proper
standard to be applied in assessing the validity of a search authorized solely by an alleged
consent that is obtained from a person after he has been placed in custody. We do note,
however, that other courts have been particularly sensitive to the heightened possibilities
for coercion when the 'consent' to a search was given by a person in custody."); id. at 248
(concluding that "when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to
justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given"(emphasis added)).
'7 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
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Incrimination Clause. 75
This observation explains another aspect of Miranda: all statements,
both exculpatory and inculpatory, are suppressed if there is a Miranda
violation.76 The Court refuses to make a distinction. Again, this remedy
is more consistent with Fourth Amendment values, which would find
that the constitutional violation occurred at the moment the police
obtained any statement through an improper search and seizure. A Fifth
Amendment analysis, on the other hand, would distinguish statements
based on whether they were actually self-incriminating.
Thus, the current Miranda warnings may actually apprise a suspect of
his Fourth Amendment rights more accurately than they do his Fifth
Amendment rights. The title of a recent article by Professor Steve D.
Clymer succinctly summarized its topic: Are Police Free To Disregard
Miranda? 77 Looking at Miranda in a Fifth Amendment light, Clymer
cogently argues that Miranda is simply a rule of evidence admissibility
that does not impose direct restraints on the conduct of police in the
interrogation room.
But the Miranda warnings do not say, "You have the right not to have
your incriminating statements used against you if there happens to be a
trial." What Miranda says is, "You have the right to remain silent." There
is a difference. Miranda's use of this phrase hints at what the Warren

7 It is interesting to consider why the Miranda Court may have used the phrase "You
have the right to remain silent." See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical
Perspective, in R.H. HELMHOLz, THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 197 (1997)
(stating that traditionally right against self-incrimination did not include any "right to
remain silent" per se); Eben Moglen, The Privilege in British North America: The Colonial
Period to the Fifth Amendment, in R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION 109 (explaining that right to remain silent was not historically encompassed
in one's right against self-incrimination); see also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 428
(1984) (holding that privilege is generally not self-executing; person must usually assert
privilege in face of government questioning). See generally Timothy P. O'Neill, Why
Miranda Does Not Prevent Confessions: Some Lessons from Albert Camus, Arthur Miller and
Oprah Winfrey, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 863, 866-874 (2001).
There appear to be two sources for Miranda's use of the phrase "You have the right
to remain silent" in 1966. First, in 1965 the Supreme Court had discussed a criminal
defendant's right under the Self-Incrimination Clause to refuse to testify on his own behalf
at trial. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Second, in 1964 in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 491 (1964), the Court referred to a suspect's "absolute constitutional right to
remain silent" in the face of custodial questioning; yet this was discussed in the context of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel rather than the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. Suffice it to say the "right to remain silent" probably has as much, if not
more, to do with Fourth Amendment autonomy values, as expressed in subsequent cases
such as Katz and Kyllo.
76 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
' Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free To DisregardMiranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447 (2002).
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Court was really concerned about: controlling police behavior and
defending the suspect's autonomy in the interrogation room, and not just
in the courtroom.
However, because Miranda was decided before Katz, Berger, and
Bumper, the Supreme Court in 1966 lacked the constitutionalvocabulary to
describe custodial interrogation in Fourth Amendment terms. Only after
Katz, Berger, and Bumper can we now understand that police questioning
is a search; that getting the suspect's answers is a seizure; and that
attempting interrogation in a custodial atmosphere provides the police
with false authority - like the illusory warrant in Bumper - that must
be neutralized by both Miranda warnings and the suspect's voluntary
Fourth Amendment consent. As seen through a Fourth Amendment
lens, the police are forbidden from obtaining even one single answer
without proper warnings and waiver.
Under a Fifth Amendment analysis, a violation of Miranda does not
result in a constitutional violation in the interrogation room itself.78 But
under the Fourth Amendment, the constitutional violation is complete
after even the first improper question and answer. This difference
illustrates why understanding the Fourth Amendment aspect of
custodial interrogation is so crucial.
VI.

WHAT IS THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RECOGNIZING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION?

At this point let us assume arguendo that custodial interrogation
implicates Fourth Amendment values as well as the Self-Incrimination
Clause.
Let us also assume that the current Miranda warnings
sufficiently apprise the suspect of his rights under both constitutional
provisions. Finally, assume that a proper Miranda waiver constitutes an
effective waiver of rights under both the Fourth Amendment and the
Self-Incrimination Clause. The issue then is whether recognizing the
Fourth Amendment implications of custodial interrogation makes any
appreciable legal difference in confession cases.
First, it is clear that, under either a Fourth or a Fifth Amendment
analysis, if a suspect in custody waives his Miranda rights, all his
resulting answers are admissible at trial.9 Conversely, under either
analysis, if a suspect in custody invokes his Miranda rights, the

7' See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text; infra notes 86-88 and accompanying

text.
This assertion assumes, of course, that the resulting confession is "voluntary" under
the Due Process Clause. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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interrogation must cease. But if the police interrogate the suspect without
a proper Miranda warning and/or waiver, the results are very different
depending on whether you employ a Fourth or a Fifth Amendment
analysis.
Under traditional Miranda Fifth Amendment analysis, the statements
cannot be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief. However, if they are
nevertheless "voluntary," they can be used for other purposes, i.e.,
impeachment.'o
But what if the statements obtained through a Miranda violation are
never used in a criminal case? Are a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights
nevertheless violated at the moment the police obtain the presumptively
compelled statements? The U.S. Supreme Court recently answered "No"
in Chavez v. Martinez.81 The four-Justice plurality concluded that "mere
coercion [caused by a Miranda violation] does not violate the text of the
Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled statements in a
criminal case against the witness." 82 The "failure to read Miranda
warnings to Martinez did not violate Martinez's constitutional rights and
cannot be grounds for a Section 1983 action."8 3 And Justice Kennedy, in
an opinion joined by Justice Stevens, stated, "I agree with [the plurality]
that failure to give a Miranda warning does not, without more, establish a
completed [constitutional] violation when the unwarned interrogation
ensues."84 Instead, "Miranda mandates a rule of exclusion" and "[tihe
exclusion of unwarned statements, when not within an exception, is a
complete and sufficient remedy. " 8'
But if Miranda is viewed as a requirement to obtain consent for a
search under the Fourth Amendment, the result is much different. First,
assume the police, as in Chavez, begin questioning a suspect in custody
without following Miranda in some way. The police then obtain an
answer to their first question. At this point Chavez holds there is no Fifth
Amendment violation. But there is, however, a Fourth Amendment
violation - the single question and answer constitutes a search and
seizure performed without consent or a warrant.

"

See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 223-24 (1971) (allowing voluntary statements

obtained as fruit of Mirandaviolation to nevertheless be used for impeachment purposes).
" Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2004 (2003) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion); id. at
2013 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
plurality opinion).
" Id. at 2002 (Thomas, J.,
plurality opinion).
Id. at 2004 (Thomas, J.,
Id. at 2013 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85 Id.
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Under a Fourth Amendment analysis - but not under a Fifth
Amendment analysis - there is a constitutional violation at the very
moment the police officer receives the first answer to his first question in the
interrogation room. A Fourth Amendment analysis would thus allow a
court to issue a permanent injunction to guarantee that a police
department never adopts a policy to go "outside Miranda."16 The Chavez
decision, on the other hand, makes it clear that such an injunction could
87
never be obtained through the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, a Fourth
Amendment analysis allows suspects denied their Miranda rights to file
section 1983 suits against police departments even if the statements are
never used at a trial; Chavez held that such a suit cannot be brought
under the Fifth Amendment.8
Second, the Fourth Amendment approach makes it much easier to
categorically condemn police departments that refuse to follow Miranda.
The Fifth Amendment's emphasis on compulsion and coercion concepts that intimate actual government misconduct - makes it hard to
justify suppressing confessions that are obtained without outrageous
police misconduct. Indeed, the remedy proposed by Chavez - a remand
to determine if the police behavior violated substantive due process
under the notoriously stringent "egregious official conduct" standard of
County of Sacramento v. Lewis 9 - may be nothing more than a chimera.
But the Fourth Amendment approach is much easier to implement. Just
as the politest police officer in the world violates the Fourth Amendment
if he makes even the briefest search of a home without a warrant or a
warrant exception,9 so too is a Fourth Amendment violation complete
with the first courteous question-and-answer following a Miranda

' See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (1998)
(popularizing expression "outside Miranda" to describe practice of police departments
consciously deciding to forego giving Miranda warnings, thus forfeiting opportunity to use
any resulting statements in state's case-in-chief; in return, however, they retain ability to
use statements for investigative leads and for impeachment at trial). Although Professor
Weisselberg condemns this police practice, the Court's recent decision in Chavez will make
it harder to combat. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. The Court will shed
more light on this issue in its forthcoming decision in Missouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700 (Mo.
2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2091 (2003). See generally Charles D. Weisselberg, Panel Five:
DeterringPolice From Deliberately Violating Miranda: In the Station House After Dickerson, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1121 (2001) (discussing questioning "outside Miranda").
See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (holding that abusive
executive action will only be said to be arbitrary if it is "most egregious official conduct").
' See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987) (holding that even slightly
moving turntable to examine serial number constitutes search under Fourth Amendment).
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violation.
Third, the fact that the very first answer in the interrogation room is
itself a Fourth Amendment violation means that future statements that
are made after proper Miranda warnings and waiver could be
suppressed under a "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis. 91 This would
supersede Elstad's Fifth Amendment analysis that distinguished
statements suppressed "merely" as products of a Miranda violation from
statements that were actually involuntary; under Elstad, only the latter
could yield the excludable fruit of the poisonous tree. 9' In place of Elstad,
a court using a Fourth Amendment analysis could simply use a
traditional Wong Sun attenuation analysis, which would undoubtedly
result in more subsequent confessions being suppressed. 9
Thus, recognizing the Fourth Amendment implications of custodial
interrogations would make it much easier to enforce the entire Miranda
regime. The Chavez decision, predicated on the Fifth Amendment, may
result in increasing numbers of police departments ignoring Miranda
with no possible sanction. Chavez rewards police departments for being
disingenuous, if not downright dishonest. But enforcing Miranda
through the Fourth Amendment would require police departments to
obey the commands of Miranda or face either injunctions or section 1983
sanctions.
VII.

WHAT ARE THE ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF

MIRANDA THAT WOULD NOT CHANGE UNDER A FOURTH AMENDMENT
ANALYSIS?

It is important to emphasize that viewing Miranda through a Fourth
Amendment lens supplements, but does not supersede, Miranda's
current role as a Fifth Amendment case.
Therefore, the Fourth
Amendment analysis will not change several key aspects of existing
Miranda doctrine.
First, a Fourth Amendment analysis arguably will not change the
Court's current policy of allowing statements obtained through Miranda
violations to be used for the purpose of impeachment. These statements,
"' See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (holding that evidence must
be excluded which is either direct or indirect product of illegal procedure). The only way
evidence may be used that has been obtained as a result of an illegal procedure is if there
exists an "intervening independent act of a free will." Id. at 486.
92 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308-09 (1985). Again, the Supreme Court will soon
re-examine some facets of the Elstad doctrine in Missouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700 (Mo.
2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2091 (2003).
" Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484.
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inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief, mayr nevertheless be used
for impeachment under current Miranda doctrine. Rethinking Miranda
under the Fourth Amendment would not change this outcome, for
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment can also be used
for impeachment.95
Second, a Fourth Amendment analysis would not scuttle the current
Miranda exceptions. In fact, Fourth Amendment analysis provides far
more persuasive reasons to support the two currently recognized
exceptions.
For example, the Supreme Court has held that a statement obtained in
violation of Miranda is nonetheless admissible in the prosecution's case96
in-chief under the "public safety" exception. But Justice O'Connor in
her separate opinion in New York v. Quarles cogently observed that while
public safety may justify an officer's refusal to give Miranda warnings
before interrogating a person in custody, there is no principled way to
allow the resulting statements into the prosecution's case-in-chief under
the aegis of the Self-Incrimination Clause. As Justice O'Connor noted,
because Miranda is predicated on the Self-Incrimination Clause, a
statement obtained through a Miranda violation must be "presumed
compelled" under that clause.97 The admission of such a statement in the
prosecution's case-in-chief, she persuasively argues, is clearly
unconstitutional.
Thus, the public safety exception is completely ad hoc and
Yet the exception can
unprincipled under the Fifth Amendment.
analysis. If the
Amendment
a
Fourth
under
convincingly be explained
either a
without
seized
have
police
statement is seen as something the
law on
of
body
large
warrant or consent, then the State can turn to the
"exigent circumstances" to justify the seizure under the Fourth
The Fourth Amendment provides a much more
Amendment. 9s
' Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 223-24 (1971).
9' United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628-29 (1980) (allowing use of evidence
obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment to impeach defendant's testimony on direct
examination); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65-66 (1954) (affirming introduction of
unlawfully seized heroin capsule to impeach defendant's direct testimony in court). Note,
however, that a Fourth Amendment approach would allow for the possibility of an
injunction to prevent a police department from going "outside Miranda" in order to
regularly obtain such impeachment. Such an injunction cannot be obtained under Chavez's
reading of the Fifth Amendment. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
' See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (stating that officers are excused
from failing to inform suspect of Mirandawarnings if public safety so necessitates).
Id. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
See, e.g., Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967) (stating that
"hot pursuit" constituted "exigent circumstances" sufficient to allow officers to enter
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satisfactory way of justifying the use of the statement by characterizing
public safety as an exigent circumstance.
The same is true for the "routine booking question" exception to
Miranda. In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 99 eight members of the Court held
that the police did not have to read Miranda warnings to an arrestee
before asking him routine booking questions. Four of the eight justices
held that the answers to such questions were not "testimonial" and
therefore were not covered by the Fifth Amendment. '1 ° The other four
justices held that these answers were indeed testimonial and thus
covered by the Fifth Amendment, but that there was a routine booking
question exception to Miranda.'
Once again, this so-called Fifth
Amendment exception is jerrybuilt and ad hoc.
Notice again how much easier it is to justify a routine booking
question exception under a Fourth Amendment analysis. Here we can
rely on theA Court's 102
well-developed "special needs" exception to the
Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment allows us to justify an
exception to Miranda because of the compelling need of law enforcement
to obtain basic information about arrestees.
Again, the Fourth
Amendment provides a more satisfying doctrinal route to reach the same
end.
Finally, there is one area where the defense can obtain relief from the
Fifth Amendment side of Miranda that is not available from a Fourth
Amendment analysis: federal habeas corpus. Viewing Miranda through
a Fifth Amendment lens, habeas corpus is clearly available. 1°3 Yet from1a4
Fourth Amendment perspective, habeas relief is obviously unavailable. 0

suspect's home without warrant minutes after robbery had been committed).
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990).
Id. at 606 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in result in part, and
dissenting in part). Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens also joined this opinion.
...Id. at 599-601. This part of the opinion, written by Justice Brennan, was joined by
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.
" See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987) (holding that supervision of
probationers constitutes "special need" that necessitates more relaxed standard for
searches); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987) (stating that employer's need to
enter employee's office, desk, or files constitutes "special need" and search therefore does
not require warrant); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (stating that education
and supervision of students is "special need," thus relaxing standard for school searches).
...See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 682 (1993) (allowing habeas corpus review of
Mirandaviolations that occur in state prosecutions).
104 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 (1976)
(holding that habeas corpus is not
vehicle for challenging Fourth Amendment violations in state prosecutions unless
petitioner did not receive "full and fair hearing" on issue in state court).
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CONCLUSION

Miranda v. Arizona was a landmark opinion. But its revered place in
the legal pantheon may have discouraged lawyers - especially criminal
defense lawyers - from questioning the basis for the decision. As this
Essay contends, if Miranda had been decided just two years later, the
Supreme Court could have used its recent decisions in Katz, Berger, and
Bumper to provide a Fourth - in addition to a Fifth - Amendment basis
for its Miranda warnings. If it had done so, the right to remain silent
would have also been seen as the right to refuse consent for a police
search and seizure conducted through custodial interrogation. And the
Miranda warnings would have been required to additionally insure that
the suspect knew he had the right to refuse to consent to police
interrogation. The false authority created by the atmosphere of custodial
interrogation - no less than the illusory warrant in Bumper v. North
Carolina- would have to be neutralized before uncoerced consent could
be given.
But because the Supreme Court did not have the benefit of Katz,
Berger, and Bumper in 1966, the Miranda decision clumsily tried to force a
square Fourth Amendment peg into a round Fifth Amendment hole.
As previously demonstrated, understanding the Fourth Amendment
values underlying the Miranda decision helps to explain some of the
most inexplicable decisions that have glossed Miranda over the years.
Cases such as Harrisv. New York, New York v. Quarles,and Pennsylvania v.
Muniz - decisions whose results find no support in traditional Fifth
Amendment analysis - are more understandable when viewed through
a Fourth Amendment lens.
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment approach makes simpler work of
the two major Miranda issues pending before the Court. The first case,
United States v. Patane, asks whether physical evidence obtained through
use of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda must be
suppressed.
The Fifth Amendment problem is that although the
statement was obtained in violation of Miranda, it was neither coerced
nor involuntary. Thus, Patane is another case that questions whether a
statement obtained in violation of Miranda has truly been
unconstitutionally obtained. Yet under a Fourth Amendment analysis,
the answer is clear. The suspect's very first answer obtained without
proper consent has been illegally seized. Period. Fruits of an illegal
seizure are always suppressed, subject, of course, to the Wong Sun
" United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1788
(2003).
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attenuation doctrine. 1 6
The second case, Missouri v. Seibert,10 7 squarely faces the Oregon v.
Elstad0 8 issue of whether the good or bad faith of the police is relevant
when police first obtain statements improperly through a Miranda
violation, and then are later able to obtain the same statements after
properly following Miranda. But under a Fourth Amendment analysis
the good or bad faith of the police is irrelevant.' 9 The first statements
were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Period. Whether
the subsequent statements are admissible will again depend on the Wong
Sun attenuation doctrine applied to the particular facts of the case."'
It is too late in the day to suggest that the Court no longer view
Miranda as a Fifth Amendment case. But it is certainly not too late to
suggest that Mirandashould now be viewed as a Fourth Amendment, as
well as a Fifth Amendment, case.
Well over a century ago in the landmark case of Boyd v. United States,"'
the Supreme Court confronted a situation in which it declared, "[Tihe
Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other. 112 It is time
that the Supreme Court said the same about Miranda v. Arizona.

See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
" Missouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2091 (2003).
10 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
1
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (holding that officer's good faith
106

reliance on neutral magistrate's issuance of warrant renders evidence seized pursuant to
that warrant admissible). This so-called "good faith" exception is irrelevant because
custodial interrogation is not accompanied by a warrant.
11' See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
...Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
12
Id. at 630.
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